STATE OF MAINE
SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT
SITTING AS THE LAW COURT

Docket No. Yor-26-118 | Related Appellate Proceeding: Yor-26-46

JUSTIN A. TAHAI, Appellant, pro se

v.

AMANDA MORSE, Appellee

APPELLANT'S EXTRAORDINARY CONSOLIDATED MOTION FOR PROCEDURAL RECTIFICATION, INSTITUTIONAL CANDOR, SUBSTANTIVE NEUTRAL INVESTIGATION, AND A REASONED AVENUE TO CHILD-PROTECTIVE RELIEF; WITH NOTICE OF THE NOVEMBER 12, 2026 PETITION FOR INVESTIGATION, IMPEACHMENT, AND REMOVAL

INCLUDING AN EXPRESSLY METAPHORICAL REQUEST FOR SEVEN SURGICAL-GRADE PROCEDURAL SHOEHORNS TO ACCOMPLISH THE LONG-OVERDUE CRANIO-RECTAL EXTRACTION OF INSTITUTIONAL ATTENTION FROM PROCEDURAL SELF-IMPORTANCE — AND INCLUDING A FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL AMENDMENT AS APPENDIX E

I. PRELIMINARY ADMONITION

1. COMES NOW Appellant, pursuant to the customary incantation of a profession curiously devoted to preserving archaic language while professing bewilderment at archaic procedure, and states as follows: procedure exists to serve law; law exists to protect rights; and neither exists merely to furnish an institution with an elaborate vocabulary for refusing to reach a disputed issue.

For avoidance of any doubt, this filing is not satirical, facetious, waggish or flippant in any way. It is expressed with candidness clearly

incomprehensible to those who would boast candor as a substantive part of their creed.

2. Appellant does not mistake the prestige of judicial office for a conclusive demonstration of institutional wisdom. Nor does he accept the astonishingly convenient premise that a judicial ruling becomes substantively unimpeachable merely because its procedural mechanics have been performed with impressive solemnity. A court may be scrupulously exact in its paperwork and grievously deficient in its attention to the human consequences of its decisions. The former does not excuse the latter.

3. The governing question is not whether the Court is pleased by Appellant's insistence. It is whether preserved legal errors, disputed record-access questions, and the lawful avenues for protecting a minor child have received the adjudication the law requires. Appellant seeks review within the Court's proper authority; he does not request exemption from the controlling orders, the child's safety requirements, or the limits of appellate jurisdiction.

II. THE RECORD IS NOT MADE LESS REAL BY ITS ADMINISTRATIVE INCONVENIENCE

4. The consolidated evidentiary hearing occurred January 16, 2026. The District Court issued its Findings and Order on February 11, 2026 in YORDC-FM-2010-00190 and BIDDC-PA-2024-01285. That order expressly addresses

shared parental rights, weekly reunification therapy, reasonable daily electronic contact, and conditional opportunities for in-person contact. Appellant disputes identified findings and implementation issues through the mechanisms reflected in the record. [February 11, 2026 Findings and Order, pp. 12–19; February 14 Rule 52(b) papers.]

5. On January 27, 2026, the transcription process for the January 16 hearing was conditioned upon a private-pay deposit quoted at $1,515.90. On February 18, Appellant requested approval of the electronic recording or an appropriate statement in lieu of transcript. Subsequent record-completion and cancellation disputes were brought to the Court's attention. The point is not that every request necessarily merited allowance; it is that meaningful review of evidentiary findings requires an intelligible and lawful record-access process, not the mere recitation of a financial obstacle. [eScribers estimate, reference MEJB11138; February 18 audio-in-lieu motion; April 24 and April 29 record-completion correspondence.]

6. In the trial-court electronic-filing process, rejected envelopes and corrective resubmissions included service-contact defects, caption and designation issues, separate-exhibit requirements, and the demand for the prescribed FM-218 form. Among the documented examples are envelopes 210756, 210987, 211286, and 220333. These are discrete administrative events, not proof that every submission was otherwise proper or that every official acted in bad faith.

Their cumulative effect is nevertheless fair subject matter for criticism: a litigant can exhaust extraordinary time curing access mechanics before a child-related request reaches the judicial officer capable of deciding it. [Tyler/eFileMaine rejection notices, April 25–28 and May 14, 2026.]

7. On June 23, 2026, the Law Court ordered in Yor-26-118 that, except for a motion to reconsider the final decision disposing of the appeal, the Clerk could docket future submissions without presenting them to the Court. Appellant understands that this directive is part of the operative procedural posture and does not pretend that labeling a document "extraordinary" overrides it. He objects, however, to any intellectual sleight of hand by which an administrative limitation on presentment is transformed into a substantive adjudication of all future child-related disputes. [June 23, 2026 Order on Pending Motions, pp. 1–2.]

8. Post-order educational, medical-record, and counseling concerns have also been documented in separate communications and trial-court filings. Appellant does not tender post-judgment events as newly admissible merits evidence in this appeal merely by mentioning them here. Their importance is narrower and indisputable: disputes affecting a child continue to require an identified, lawful forum and timely procedures. [June 22 school records; July 27–August 29 provider-access correspondence; related trial-court notices.]

III. THE COURT'S CALENDAR DOES NOT OUTRANK A CHILD'S CHILDHOOD

9. To the extent this Court considers Appellant's repeated requests an unwelcome expenditure of judicial time, Appellant formally objects to the breathtaking asymmetry of that complaint. He has spent years of his life pursuing the protection of his parental relationship through the very institutions now positioned to regard his continued insistence as a procedural burden. His son has passed through years of childhood that no appellate mandate, amended docket entry, corrective memorandum, or belatedly scheduled hearing can restore.

10. The Court may postpone its calendar; reschedule argument; correct a caption; return a filing; demand additional copies; and enter a later order explaining why an earlier order requires no further consideration. It may do these things again, and again, and again. It cannot reconstruct an ordinary afternoon between a father and son after that afternoon has ceased to exist. The Court's time is valuable because it belongs to the public. A child's remaining years are precious because they cannot be replenished at all.

11. Accordingly, Appellant declines to receive any lecture about "wasting the Court's time" that refuses a corresponding accounting of the years already spent in litigation and the child-development time that has been irreversibly consumed. It would be a singular triumph of bureaucratic vanity to treat a

judge's additional hour as an intolerable injury while dismissing a minor child's additional month as a routine incident of process. The former may inconvenience an institution. The latter may permanently alter a relationship.

12. The Court need not be persuaded of Appellant's personal virtue to understand this distinction. It need only exercise the judgment that its office presupposes. The childhood of a litigant's son is not a line item in the judiciary's scheduling budget. No child has ever recovered a missed year because a docket was closed with impeccable formatting.

IV. FINALITY IS NOT AN ALCHEMICAL SUBSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE

13. Appellant acknowledges the necessity of orderly procedure, preservation requirements, jurisdictional boundaries, and final judgments. He rejects only the extraordinary conceit that those mechanisms automatically answer the merits of every issue they prevent from being heard. A rejected filing is not necessarily a meritless claim; a denied motion is not necessarily a sufficient explanation; and an exhausted procedural avenue is not proof that the underlying injustice was imaginary.

14. A jurisdictional limitation may be lawfully dispositive. It should be identified as such. A claim may be forfeited. The legal grounds for that conclusion should be stated. Evidence may be outside the record. The Court should distinguish that evidentiary limit from a finding that the disputed event

never occurred. What is indefensible is the obscuring of these separate propositions beneath a majestic but empty invocation of "procedure," as though the word itself performs legal analysis.

15. If a court may conclusively determine a parent's options through technical requirements, then precision concerning those requirements must be matched by precision concerning the relief that remains available. A system that demands exact obedience from an unrepresented parent while tolerating ambiguity about how the parent may obtain a decision on a child's welfare cannot credibly celebrate itself as an exemplar of access to justice.

V. THE COURT MAY YET RECOVER PUBLIC RESPECT THROUGH THE RADICAL EXPERIMENT OF CANDOR

16. Appellant proposes a remedy whose simplicity is evidently almost too extravagant for present institutional fashion: when error is established, acknowledge it. When a filing was rejected, identify the actual deficiency. When relief falls outside appellate jurisdiction, identify the tribunal authorized to consider it. When the record is insufficient, state precisely what is absent and why it matters. When a reasoned answer has already been supplied, identify the order and its controlling rationale. This is not insubordination. It is the minimum intellectual hygiene of judicial administration.

17. If the Court elects to own what Appellant regards as institutional idiocy instead of perpetually dressing avoidable absurdity in the ceremonial robes of judicial necessity, it may very well recover a measure of public respect through what would be, in Appellant's experience of these proceedings, a remarkable exercise of candor. That assessment is plainly Appellant's criticism, not an established finding of judicial misconduct. The opportunity to demonstrate accountability nevertheless remains real.

18. Respect is not a hereditary estate appurtenant to a judicial commission. The Court may command obedience to lawful orders; it cannot command intellectual admiration for administrative outcomes. Candor does not debase the bench. The unwillingness to distinguish a correctable mistake from an institutional embarrassment does. Judicial dignity, properly understood, is not a porcelain ornament that breaks upon exposure to criticism. It is the authority earned by faithful application of law.

VI. THE SEVEN PROCEDURAL SHOEHORNS—AN EXPRESSLY METAPHORICAL REQUEST

19. To convey the depth of the institutional obstruction he perceives, Appellant renews his deliberately severe figure of speech: seven surgical-grade procedural shoehorns, one for each place where judicial attention might otherwise remain lodged within the cranio-rectal recesses of procedural self-

importance. The imagery is rhetorical and nonphysical. Appellant seeks no instrument, physical encounter, injury, or action against any judicial officer. The seven extractions requested are legal and intellectual: (i) facts from supposition; (ii) record access from prohibitive process; (iii) judicial presentment from clerical circularity; (iv) child-centered urgency from calendar worship; (v) reasons from formulaic disposition; (vi) institutional candor from reflexive defensiveness; and (vii) substantive justice from the hollow triumph of procedural completion.

20. As professional courtesy, the request for issuance of surgical grade equipment is to alleviate, remediate, AND SUBSTANTIVELY mitigate concerns of substantial institutional infection requiring additional investigation the court would likely adjudicate with prejudice before notice of any requirement for amputation may be put forth by medical personnel. Were this Court to accomplish any substantial number of those modest feats without the aid of figurative orthopedic equipment, Appellant would gladly withdraw the imagery and commend the result. Until then, the metaphor shall stand as criticism of procedure—not a threat to persons and not a substitute for identifying cognizable legal grounds for relief.

VII. THE RIGHT TO DISSENT DOES NOT REQUIRE A LICENSE FROM THE OFFENDED INSTITUTION

21. Appellant will comply with lawful court orders. He will not, however, consent to the proposition that judicial criticism must be made sufficiently delicate to spare the institution the discomfort of its own record. If future decisions produce further perceived injustice, Appellant reserves the right to respond through lawful written advocacy, authorized review, and public criticism with exceptional rhetorical severity. No threat of force is expressed, intended, or requested.

22. If such criticism is considered extraordinarily rude, the relevant question remains whether the complained-of official action was lawful and reasoned. Professional irritation is not a standard of appellate review. The Court's institutional feelings are not a counterweight to a child's welfare. And a father's refusal to praise a process he believes has failed his family is not itself proof that the process was sound.

VIII. ALLEGIANCE TO THE PEOPLE, NOT JUDICIAL VANITY; THE OBLIGATION OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY

23. My allegiance is to the People; I have and will show no allegiance, obsequiousness, deference, or respect for a judiciary who continue to harm them across generations.

24. If such accountability must be built by the People themselves, I will do the goddamn work of building it—through verified evidence, lawful proceedings, public scrutiny, and organized reform. The People should never be afraid of their government. Government officials who continue to harm the People should fear the lawful consequences of exposure, independent investigation, and accountability. Tyranny will not be tolerated, and no antiquated ceremony of office shall place proven misconduct beyond scrutiny.

25. Do not patronize me with your substantial idiocy further. There is a difference between a threat of violence and a good-faith caution concerning the consequences of continued abuse of public authority: the actual words, context, substantive intent, and governing law must be examined rather than displaced by performative indignation at the speaker's tone. A learned profession ought to be capable of understanding that distinction without further displays of institutional cowardice or the convenient dismissal of alleged generational harms to children and families. Appellant calls exclusively for lawful accountability.

26. A robe is not a substitute for competence. A title is not evidence. Tradition is not justification. And the age of a destructive practice does not make it wise—it makes the refusal to correct it more disgraceful.

27. I reject the notion that justice requires reverence for the people administering it. Respect for justice demands scrutiny of judicial power, not submission to judicial vanity.

28. There is nothing noble about making a parent master procedural trivia while a child grows older waiting for meaningful relief. Nothing learned about refusing to learn. Nothing honorable about demanding flawless performance from families in crisis while excusing institutional failure as the ordinary course of business.

29. When procedure prevents a serious claim from being heard, examine the procedure. When delay defeats the purpose of relief, examine the delay. When an institution demands accountability from everyone except itself, examine the institution.

30. Do not offer antiquated bullshit as though its longevity were proof of its legitimacy.

31. "This is how we have always done it" is not a defense. It is an admission that habit has been permitted to substitute for judgment. A profession claiming expertise should be the first to identify obsolete practices, measure their consequences, and correct them—not the last to surrender them.

32. A child's remaining childhood is not an extension of your litigation calendar.

33. No later opinion can return a missed birthday. No impeccably formatted order can recreate years of ordinary family life. A remedy that arrives after the opportunity it was supposed to protect has disappeared deserves scrutiny, not institutional congratulations.

34. And do not substitute a debate about my tone for an examination of the substance. My language does not establish my allegations; the evidence must do that. Neither does your displeasure with my language answer them. Examine the record. Explain the decisions. Address the alleged harm.

35. I am not demanding immunity for myself. I am demanding accountability from those exercising power over other people's lives: fair hearings, accessible records, reasoned decisions, timely remedies, independent investigation of misconduct, and lawful consequences where misconduct is established.

36. Where that accountability is missing, I will do the goddamn work of pursuing it. I will preserve the record, publish substantiated facts, challenge institutional excuses, and organize for reform. I will not confuse professional comfort with the public interest.

37. You are public servants, not a priesthood. Your customs are not sacred. Your authority does not make your reasoning infallible, and your institutional reputation is not more important than the people affected by your decisions.

38. The People are not your subjects. Our families are not raw material for procedural ritual. Our children do not owe you their childhoods.

39. Justice is not your cult's to continue debauching—it belongs to the People. Restore it.

IX. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROMISE: FREELY AND WITHOUT SALE; PROMPTLY AND WITHOUT DELAY

40. THE STATE MADE THE PROMISE IN ITS OWN CONSTITUTION. Article I, Section 19 of the Maine Constitution does not promise a citizen a ceremonial audience with procedure. It promises remedy by due course of law and declares that right and justice shall be administered "freely and without sale, completely and without denial, promptly and without delay." [P1] The words are Maine's, not Appellant's. A learned profession that insists upon exact adherence to its rules must be willing to confront the exact words of the charter that creates its authority.

41. FREELY AND WITHOUT SALE. Those words do not abolish every lawful filing fee, transcript charge, or litigation cost. They do command serious inquiry when cost and procedure combine to deny a person any realistic opportunity to have preserved claims heard. An estimated $1,515.90 private-pay transcription deposit was not imaginary to this Appellant; it was a dated demand connected to the record of a January 16, 2026 hearing. The legal question is what review could actually be obtained with the record that remained. The institutional

question is why a government so accomplished at charging for access is seemingly less accomplished at making access meaningfully usable. [C2] [P1]

42. COMPLETELY AND WITHOUT DENIAL. No appellate court is required to grant every motion, nor may a litigant manufacture jurisdiction by changing a caption. But there exists a distinction, intellectually basic yet practically enormous, between rejecting an unavailable remedy with a reasoned explanation and leaving an urgent child-related grievance without an intelligible forum. When the judicial process sends a parent from the trial court to the appellate court, from an appellate procedural order back to the trial court, and then back again, the proper inquiry is whether the public has been given a route to adjudication or merely an expensive tour of institutional boundaries.

43. PROMPTLY AND WITHOUT DELAY. Delay has lawful causes; due process requires time for all parties, and protecting victims of abuse and children may require careful hearings. Those qualifications do not transform avoidable delay into an independent public virtue. The State must be able to explain what remained pending, why, when the parties were notified, whether an expedited route existed, and how the irreversible passage of childhood was weighed. No retrospective affirmation can return the developmental time during which a court-ordered contact opportunity was disputed and no practical protocol was secured.

44. FUNDAMENTAL ASYMMETRY. The Court may extend an administrative timetable; a child cannot extend the calendar of being fifteen or

sixteen. A transcript can be reproduced, a portal defect corrected, and a ruling clarified. A missed birthday cannot be recreated by attaching a corrected certificate of service. What, then, is the learned profession administering when it insists that the preservation of administrative convenience should be accepted as sufficient answer to the destruction of opportunities that cannot be restored?

45. THE CONSTITUTION IS NOT A PAMPHLET TO BE PRAISED ONLY ON CEREMONIAL OCCASIONS. Article I, Section 19 is not an automatic verdict in Appellant's favor, and its precise judicial application must be determined according to governing precedent, preserved claims, jurisdiction, and available remedies. That limitation is no excuse for ignoring its express standard when evaluating administration of the courts. The public is entitled to ask for evidence of compliance with the constitutional mission, not for incantations about the importance of that mission.

46. THE RIGHT TO REMONSTRATE IS ALSO WRITTEN DOWN. Article I, Section 15 protects the People's orderly and peaceable right to petition and remonstrate concerning wrongs. Appellant's intended public dissemination is an exercise of lawful civic advocacy, not an invitation to threaten public servants, interfere with pending decisions, or violate protective orders. [P2] The point of petition is to obtain responsive government; to treat every fierce petition as an affront merely because its criticism is severe would invert the relationship between sovereign People and public institutions. Your seats do not belong to you.

47. IT IS NEITHER RESPECTFUL NOR SOPHISTICATED TO SUPPLY AN ANCIENT PRACTICE AS ITS OWN DEFENSE. “We have always done it this way” has never been an adequate substitute for an explanation of statutory authorization, constitutional effect, and actual consequence. It is less compelling still when the practice may cost a family years while the institution demands that the affected parent demonstrate extraordinary patience toward its every procedural preference. It is the disgraceful judicial equivalent to “I was just following orders.”

X. THE PROFESSION RECEIVED ITS OWN NOTICE: THE 2022 EMERGENCY-CUSTODY FINDINGS

48. THE STATE STUDIED THIS PROBLEM BEFORE THE PRESENT APPEALS. In December 2022, the Maine Commission on Domestic and Sexual Abuse furnished the Legislature a report arising from concern that parents were being separated from children for extended periods while family litigation remained pending. Its working group included the Judicial Branch, family-law professionals, legal-assistance providers, domestic-violence experts, and other stakeholders. Its assigned subject included timely enforcement or modification of existing custody orders. [P3] The profession was not required to await a father’s next angry filing to learn that these were human problems, not merely docket-management abstractions.

49. THE REPORT RECORDED PEOPLE DESCRIBING SERIOUS DELAY. Of 23 parents who provided timing information in that survey, the report stated that 73% reported waiting more than one month for a judge to hear urgent concerns. This was a small, self-selected, mixed-process survey; it is NOT a statewide prevalence estimate. Yet the existence of recorded complaints and the official report recommending improvement establish that the issue was squarely before state policymakers and professional participants by 2022. [P3] The Court is entitled to assess methodology; it is not entitled to pretend the publication never occurred.

50. THE REPORT ALSO EXAMINED THE SYSTEM'S CAPACITY. The working group discussed resources, emergency response, and avenues for prompt examination of parental-rights concerns. Some recommendations involved difficult competing considerations, including protection against abuse and due process for both parties. Those distinctions must remain visible. Appellant does not turn a report about some families into a judicial finding about his own. He invokes it as documentary proof of an institutional discussion that existed years before the January 2026 hearing.

51. PRECISELY BECAUSE THE SUBJECT WAS KNOWN, THE NEXT QUESTIONS MUST BE PRECISE. Which recommendations were adopted? Which were rejected? What funds were requested and supplied? What standards were established for urgent parent-child contact disputes? What measurable

indicators were used to determine whether families received earlier hearings, practical implementation of orders, and fewer avoidable returns of legally significant filings? The public should not be asked to accept the existence of a working group as proof that the resulting harms have been remedied.

52. NO DECENTLY GOVERNED SYSTEM SHOULD TREAT A CHILD'S DEVELOPMENTAL YEARS AS AN ACCEPTABLE RESIDUAL COST OF ADMINISTRATIVE CONGESTION. The assertion here is an ethical and institutional criticism, not a judicial finding that every official possessed bad intent. If inadequate staffing, judicial case-management decisions, or defective technology caused delay, responsibility should be identified accurately. Candor demands causes; accountability demands documented correction.

XI. THE JUDICIARY PROVIDED EDUCATION ON THE VERY HARMS NOW IN DISPUTE

53. THE LEGISLATURE REQUIRED ANNUAL PROFESSIONAL INSTRUCTION. Under 4 M.R.S. § 10-A, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court must establish annual education for that Court's justices concerning domestic violence and child abuse, neglect, and maltreatment. Parallel duties appear in 4 M.R.S. § 122 for Superior Court justices and § 164(19) for District Court judges. [P4] The statutes establish obligations to provide instruction. They

do not, by themselves, prove attendance by each named judicial officer; that question requires rosters or other records.

54. THE 2025 TASK FORCE RECORDED A LARGE EDUCATIONAL EVENT. The Maine Justice for Children Task Force's report, submitted January 15, 2026 to the Supreme Judicial Court, described the Judicial Branch's April 3–4, 2025 conference, "Improving Family Outcomes Through Effective Communication in High Conflict Cases." The report identified the High Conflict Institute among presenters and approximately 250 participants per day. It reported 2,060 total education credits, including 345 judicial education credits, 965 attorney CLE credits, 587 GAL continuing-professional credits, and 163 legal-ethics credits. Those figures count CREDITS, not separate persons, and they do not establish that any specific member of the Law Court attended. [P5]

55. THE REPORT HAS A CRITICAL SCOPE LIMIT. The Justice for Children Task Force chiefly addresses the child-welfare system and its intersection with courts, counsel, and agencies; it is not proof that every program addressed contested divorce or every problem raised in this particular case. But the conference's expressly named subject—effective communication in high-conflict cases—shows professional attention to exactly the type of inter-adult conflict and child-impact management that the judiciary insists is central to these proceedings.

56. EDUCATION IS INPUT; OUTCOMES ARE THE TEST. No court may properly claim that completing a continuing-education credit makes an

individual decision infallible. Conversely, no advocate may claim that any unfavorable decision proves the judge ignored the training. What can be demanded is the intermediate evidence: training agenda, materials, roster of officials who attended, learning objectives, subsequent protocols, revised family-case practice, implementation results, and documented explanation for persistent delay. [P5]

57. THE JUDICIARY'S OWN ETHICAL TEXT IS MORE DIRECT THAN ANY RHETORICAL SHOEHORN. Maine Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 2.5 requires judicial and administrative duties to be performed competently and diligently; its guidance discusses unnecessary delay and cost and regard for parties' right to be heard. Rule 2.6 preserves the legal opportunity to be heard. The Code does not make every legal error an ethical violation, and judges must also resist public pressure upon their decisions. Yet the public may insist that published standards be taken seriously when administrative performance is scrutinized. [P6]

58. KNOWLEDGE FOLLOWED BY UNCORRECTED RISK IS THE SHARPEST QUESTION TO PUBLIC TRUST. The existence of professional workshops is not proof of conspiratorial design, and the presence of continuing problems is not proof that no improvement was attempted. Nevertheless, an institution that has studied these foreseeable harms cannot plausibly respond to a documented complaint with the pretense that the effects of delay, conflict, and lost parental time are beyond the horizon of professional knowledge.

XII. THE MONEY MUST BE EXAMINED AS CAREFULLY AS THE PEOPLE ARE

59. ARTICLE VI PROTECTS THE COMPENSATION OF THE JUDICIARY. Article VI, Section 2 provides that justices and judges receive stated compensation that is not diminished during their tenure and may receive no other fee or reward for their judicial services. [P7] This structure helps secure judicial independence; it is not evidence of corruption. Appellant invokes it to emphasize a different asymmetry: the professional office enjoys legal continuity and financial protection, while the unrepresented litigant must absorb the cost of navigating a system whose delays may consume opportunities that money cannot replace.

60. JUDICIAL COMPENSATION WAS THE SUBJECT OF LEGISLATIVE INCREASES. Enacted state budget language directed 3% salary increases for Supreme Judicial, Superior, and District Court judges and justices effective July 1, 2025 and again July 1, 2026. [P8] These appropriations are lawful compensation policy. They establish neither personal profiteering from individual cases nor a performance-based reward for denying parent-child contact. The point is public accountability: salary protection and funded operations cannot be the only aspects of judicial administration consistently insulated from the consequences of underperformance.

61. THE JUDICIAL BRANCH'S OWN FY2025 REPORT DESCRIBES THE PUBLIC MONEY. It reports about $117.3 million in total FY2025

expenditures, approximately $65.5 million in personal-services expenses, and about $23.5 million in revenue, while acknowledging that original-action family matters remained among categories affected by backlogs. [P9] Revenue collected by courts is not synonymous with personal judicial profit or an unlawful sale of justice. It does, however, invite exact accounting of whether the public receives accessible, timely adjudication in exchange for the resources entrusted to the institution.

62. THE TITLE IV-D STRUCTURE PROVIDES AN ADDITIONAL REASON FOR TRANSPARENCY. Federal Title IV-D child-support services operate under 42 U.S.C. §§ 651–669. Section 655 generally provides federal reimbursement of 66% for eligible state program costs; section 658a governs incentive payments using specified program-performance measures. [P10] These are public funding arrangements for support administration and enforcement, not proof that any judge is paid for restricting contact or that state officials collect private bounties.

63. FOLLOW THE ACTUAL FIVE MEASURES. The federal incentive system tracks paternity establishment, establishment of support orders, current support collections, arrears collections, and cost-effectiveness. [P11] It is a legitimate question whether these administrative measures also capture family stability, due-process burdens, timely review, appropriate modification, and the

developmental cost of unnecessarily prolonged disputes. The absence of such metrics would be a policy concern—not, by itself, proof of criminal intent.

64. THE AUDITOR FOUND A CONCRETE DEFICIENCY IN ACTUAL COST ACCOUNTING. Maine's FY2025 Single Audit Finding 2025-048, publicly reproduced in a Federal Audit Clearinghouse finding entry, concerned expenditure controls for child-support services involving DHHS and the Judicial Branch. In a seven-transfer test, the auditor reported a missing quarterly report and incomplete reconciliation of estimated and actual court-service costs; the annual actual per-minute rate had not been updated as specified. The finding identified approximately $17.7 million in federal CSS expenditures, of which about $2.7 million related to court services. It was recorded as a significant deficiency, with NO questioned costs and no finding of fraud. [P12]

65. NO ONE NEEDS TO INVENT A RACKET WHERE A REPORTABLE ACCOUNTING DEFICIENCY ALREADY WARRANTS CORRECTION. The departments agreed to corrective action, including improved procedures and oversight. Appellant seeks proof of whether those changes were completed and independently verified—not an unsupported assertion that the audit itself establishes theft, bribery, or an illicit enterprise.

66. WHICH COSTS WERE ELIGIBLE, WHICH MINUTES WERE CHARGED, AND WHICH RECONCILIATIONS WERE COMPLETED? The public can ask for nonprivileged summaries of the cooperative agreements,

allocation methodologies, audit work papers available for release, rate calculations, actual-cost true-ups, corrective-action plans, and any later monitoring reports. The public need not accept an accounting presentation as inherently accurate merely because it came on official letterhead.

67. “FREELY AND WITHOUT SALE” IS A CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO THE DELIVERY OF JUSTICE, NOT A SHORTCUT TO A FRAUD VERDICT. It would be improper to treat every invoice, salary, support enforcement action, or fee as evidence of racketeering. It would be equally impoverished reasoning to dismiss questions about financial design simply because the practices are authorized by statute. Lawful incentives can be studied for unintended effects; unlawful diversion or misrepresentation requires its own evidence. [P1] [P10] [P12]

68. THE MORE IMPORTANT PUBLIC ACCOUNTING IS OF THE COSTS NEVER PLACED IN A LEDGER: months awaiting clarification; hours reconstructing filings; the value of time taken from work and family stability; and childhood experiences that vanish during contested enforcement. The profession has learned enough economics to calculate agency cost-effectiveness. It must not pretend to be incapable of recognizing the limits of a metric that does not count a child’s lost year.

XIII. ON THE ALLEGED RACKETEERING THEORY AND THE DUTY NOT TO CONFUSE SUSPICION WITH PROOF

69. APPELLANT'S CONCERN ABOUT A LEGAL RACKET IS AN ALLEGATION TO BE TESTED, NOT A JUDGMENT HEREBY ENTERED. He believes that prolonged procedures, high transaction costs, institutional gatekeeping, and economic incentives can produce self-reinforcing harms for families. That critique warrants scrutiny. But statutory RICO liability does not arise merely because an agency receives funds, a judge earns a salary, a lawyer bills a client, or an adverse ruling is issued.

70. A LEGAL RICO CLAIM REQUIRES SPECIFIC ELEMENTS. Federal law, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1964, identifies qualifying predicate offenses and imposes requirements for an enterprise, a pattern of racketeering activity, participation, and—where civil damages are sought—injury to business or property caused by the violation. Fraud theories require particular factual support; disagreement with judicial decisions is not itself mail fraud, wire fraud, or extortion. [P13]

71. THE PRESENT PUBLIC RECORD DOES NOT ESTABLISH THAT THRESHOLD. The quoted audit finding identified no questioned costs and did not conclude that intentional criminal conduct occurred. The workshop report does not prove shared intent to injure families. Judicial pay does not prove personal gain from particular outcomes. Appellant demands preservation and independent examination of records that might corroborate or refute any specific misconduct

allegation. He does not claim the evidence reviewed thus far adjudicates a RICO offense.

72. THE FILING IS THEREFORE AN EVIDENCE-PRESERVATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY DEMAND, NOT A SUBSTITUTE INDICTMENT. The distinction is the very one Appellant asks a self-described learned profession to honor: one cannot condemn the citizen for making unsupported inferences while expecting the public to accept unsupported judicial or institutional assurances. Proof must be particular, auditable, and equally demanded of all parties.

73. THE MOST EGREGIOUS CORRUPTION OF HUMANITY IS KNOWINGLY ALLOWING HARM TO CHILDREN FOR THE PRESERVATION OF AN ANTIQUATED DEBAUCHERY OF JUSTICE IN WHICH THE LEGAL PROFESSION DARES TO PLAY WITH THE LIVES OF OTHERS. Appellant rejects the impoverished premise that corruption begins and ends with a traced bribe, kickback, invoice, or personal financial benefit. There is a more fundamental moral and institutional betrayal: the failure to confront foreseeable, preventable injury to children after those entrusted with their welfare have been informed of its risks. This self-proclaimed learned profession has sponsored instruction concerning trauma, high-conflict families, child development, and the consequences of delay. It cannot present those subjects as important in its own classrooms while treating evidence of their consequences as an administrative inconvenience in the lives of actual children. The question

demanding an answer is not merely WHO WAS PAID, but WHO WAS INFORMED, WHAT POWER THEY POSSESSED TO CORRECT THE PROBLEM, WHAT THEY DID OR FAILED TO DO, AND WHAT CHILDREN LOST WHILE THE SYSTEM PROCEEDED AS USUAL. The educational record establishes institutional notice of general risks; specific knowledge, preventability, and responsibility in these proceedings must be determined from the underlying record, not presumed. RICO liability separately requires proof of its statutory elements. But no failure to prove a racketeering predicate can transmute proven indifference to a child's welfare into moral innocence. Judicial robes, professional titles, and procedural antiquity confer no exemption from accountability for knowingly tolerated harm.

XIV. PUBLIC NOTICE TO THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES; PEACEABLE ACCOUNTABILITY

74. THE GOVERNOR'S OFFICE AND THE LEGISLATURE ARE REQUESTED TO RECEIVE THIS DOCUMENT FOR NONADJUDICATIVE POLICY AWARENESS, SEPARATE FROM THE COURT'S DECISION ON ANY PENDING MATTER. Any courtesy transmission should be made through an authorized public-records or constituent-contact route, with notice to the parties as required. The request is for oversight of statewide resources, funding controls,

administrative access, and prospective reform—not for executive pressure upon an individual judge deciding an individual case.

75. THE GOAL IS TO AVERT FURTHER EROSION OF PUBLIC TRUST THROUGH PEACEFUL INSTITUTIONAL CORRECTION. The People's right of petition and remonstrance is explicitly orderly and peaceable. [P2] Appellant seeks lawful scrutiny and transparent answers so that grievance is addressed by accountable government, not driven into further alienation by obdurate refusal to explain. References to public unrest are neither threats nor forecasts; the remedy sought is constitutional petition, lawful investigation, legislative reform, and independent review.

76. THE EXECUTIVE SHOULD BE ASKED FOR ITS OWN VERIFIABLE RECORD. DHHS participation in the Title IV-D cooperative agreement and the auditor's recommended control improvements fall within administrative channels distinct from appellate adjudication. The Governor's Office may receive a request that appropriate agencies publish corrective-action status, accountable contacts, dates of completion, and available public documentation. The judiciary's decisional independence remains intact.

77. THE LEGISLATURE MAY ASK WHETHER THE PROMISE OF PROMPT JUSTICE HAS BEEN GIVEN OPERATING METRICS. Legislative committees can obtain nonconfidential aggregate statistics concerning emergency family motions, time to hearing, time to order, resubmission rates, filing rejection

categories, record-access barriers, judicial education offerings, and the measures used to evaluate family-case practices. The point is not to secure political control over judgments; it is to ensure the machinery of government is open to measurement.

78. WHAT THE PEOPLE ASK IS NOT MONARCHICAL FAVOR, BUT ACCOUNTABILITY. Appellant asks for truthful records, timely responses, and measurable improvements. He will not confuse the professional comfort of public office with the public interest; neither will he propose violence, retaliation, or extrajudicial punishment. The remedy sought belongs to the Constitution: reasoned law, peaceful petition, and a justice system whose public claims can withstand public verification.

XV. THE KNOWN GENERATIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF PROTRACTED CONFLICT, DEVELOPMENTAL DELAY, AND PROCEDURAL EXCLUSION

79. THE COURT HAS HAD DECADES TO LEARN THE CONSEQUENCES. By 1991, a meta-analysis of 92 studies had already examined children's adjustment after parental divorce. By 2018, a major evidence review explained the relationships between interparental conflict, children's emotional security, parent-child relationships, and youth psychopathology. These are not secret discoveries awaiting a courthouse ribbon-cutting ceremony. Nor do they

license a finding against either parent without evidence. They do establish that prolonged, poorly managed family conflict is a recognized developmental concern rather than an eccentric litigant's invention. [R1–R2]

80. THE CENTRAL RISK IS NOT THE LABEL "DIVORCE"; IT IS THE CHILD'S EXPERIENCE. The 2018 review identifies how parents express and manage conflict as material to child outcomes, including children's understanding of conflict and the quality of their relationships with caregivers. Consequently, a court cannot responsibly assume that the mere completion of an adversarial proceeding extinguishes the emotional circumstances generated or left unresolved by that proceeding. A docket entry cannot regulate the emotional reality of a household by fiat. [R1]

81. A SUPPORTIVE PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP IS NOT A CLERICAL CONVENIENCE. A meta-analysis of 52 studies of nonresident fathering found that positive involvement and the quality of father-child relationships were associated with child well-being; mere contact frequency and financial provision were not consistently associated in the same manner. The scientifically defensible interest is a safe, supportive, enduring relationship—not an automatic numerical visitation quota or any presumption that contact is appropriate regardless of safety. Reducing the issue to whether a box can be checked on a calendar misses the central empirical point. [R3]

82. CHILDHOOD IS A DEVELOPMENTAL PERIOD, NOT A RESCHEDULABLE PROCEEDING. Harvard's Center on the Developing Child explains that excessive or prolonged stress can become harmful when reliable adult support is absent, and that supportive relationships can buffer adversity. The Center's 2026 working paper continues to emphasize stable, predictable environments and protective relationships. A court need not diagnose a particular child from a general publication to recognize the obvious institutional implication: time-sensitive support matters, and mere institutional passage of time is not neutral. [R6–R7]

83. THE CDC HAS IDENTIFIED PARENTAL-SEPARATION INSTABILITY AMONG CHILDHOOD ADVERSITIES. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention identifies instability arising from parental separation among environments that may undermine a child's safety, stability, and bonding. The CDC also stresses that safe, stable, nurturing relationships and environments can prevent or mitigate adversity. To be precise, parental separation does not prove maltreatment; litigation does not automatically cause toxic stress; and a court order does not establish a diagnosis. The point is foreseeable developmental risk deserving competent assessment. [R8–R9]

84. THE LONG-TERM ASSOCIATIONS ARE OBSERVABLE, NOT MYSTICAL. A 2019 meta-analysis encompassing 54 studies and more than 500,000 participants reported associations between parental divorce and later

mental-health outcomes, including elevated pooled odds of depression, distress, and some substance-use outcomes. These are population-level associations, influenced by selection, prior conflict, safety conditions, and other factors. Appellant does not claim that any such outcome is inevitable for his son. He demands that the institution stop treating preventable loss of time and stability as analytically irrelevant simply because the case file has a procedural designation. [R4]

85. THE GENERATIONAL DIMENSION IS DOCUMENTED—WITH LIMITS. A 52-study systematic review and meta-analysis found that parents' adverse childhood experiences were associated with children's internalizing and externalizing mental-health difficulties, with pooled correlations of approximately 0.17 and 0.20. The researchers did not find significant associations with every developmental outcome and called for more work on mechanisms. That is the honest scientific account: intergenerational risk exists, but neither destiny nor causation in this case is thereby proved. The responsibility to recognize risk precedes the ability to prove a specific future injury. [R5]

86. THE GENERATIONAL PATTERN IS NOT INEVITABLE AND THEREFORE IS NOT EXCUSABLE. A 2024 study of 1,016 U.S. parents of children ages one to five linked parental positive childhood experiences with children's positive experiences and well-being, alongside documented associations involving adversity. The publication underscores a principle of profound

relevance: conditions that protect families can alter trajectories. An institution cannot reasonably invoke the complexity of intergenerational harm as an excuse to do nothing when the same science identifies protective relationships, stability, and responsive intervention as meaningful. [R10]

87. SCHOOL FUNCTIONING AND DEVELOPMENTAL STABILITY WARRANT SPECIFIC FACTUAL ATTENTION. The project's June 2026 school-source chronology reports 18.5 absences and 68 tardies for the 2025–2026 school year, with a separate first-period detail reporting 63 tardies. Those figures require comparison to native school records, the school's definitions, excused-status coding, transportation information, and the child's circumstances. They do not alone identify a culpable adult or establish causation. They do show why requests to examine educational stability should be assessed on evidence rather than categorically dismissed as a parent's annoying insistence. [C6]

88. FINANCIAL DEPLETION COMPOUNDS THE COST OF PROTRACTED FAMILY LITIGATION. In the 2022 Justice Gap Study, the Legal Services Corporation found that low-income Americans received no or insufficient assistance for 92% of substantial civil legal problems and identified cost as a major barrier. That national survey is not a measurement of Maine's court system, much less a finding about this appeal. It does expose the folly of treating technical proficiency and repeated paid services as effortless prerequisites for persons whose most basic family interests are at stake. A court can demand

compliance; it should still confront the real accessibility and cumulative-cost consequences of the process it administers. [R11]

89. THE SOCIETAL COST OF ADVERSITY IS NOT AN ABSTRACT MORALIZATION. A 2023 economic evaluation in JAMA Network Open estimated that ACE-associated adult health consequences represented an annual U.S. economic burden of $14.1 trillion, predominantly through monetized lost healthy-life years rather than cash outlays. The estimate concerns a broad spectrum of adversities—not family court delay, not Maine, and not damages in this action. It is relevant only to the scale of the public-health stakes when preventable childhood adversity is disregarded as somebody else's administrative problem. [R12]

90. PROTECTION AGAINST ABUSE REQUIRES SUBSTANTIVE NEUTRAL INVESTIGATION, NOT COLLEGIAL IPSE DIXIT OR CREDENTIAL-BASED PRESUMPTION. Maine law treats safety and well-being as primary. That command neither confers a proprietary monopoly upon the first accusation nor authorizes the bench to treat the professional familiarity, seniority, or rhetorical certainty of a thirty-plus-year member of the bar as evidentiary corroboration. When allegations of abuse, coercion, alienation, interference, developmental injury, and continuing risk intersect, the legally serious response is preservation of evidence, competent neutral investigation, explicit findings tied to identified proof, and narrowly tailored protection. Appellant does not ask the Court

to subordinate safety to contact. He demands that safety be determined through an impartial, auditable process rather than through prestige heuristics, collegial halo effects, procedural inertia, or the ipse dixit of counsel. To the extent the January 16, 2026 hearing record reflects reliance upon counsel's claimed decades of professional standing, the audio and transcript—not professional familiarity—must establish what was said, what evidence supported it, and why it was credited. [L1; C1–C3]

90A. A CLAIM OF ABUSE THAT CAN ALTER A CHILD'S REMAINING CHILDHOOD WARRANTS INVESTIGATION COMMENSURATE WITH ITS CONSEQUENCES. Temporary safeguards may be necessary. Temporary assumptions must not become permanent facts merely because delay silently performs the conversion. The more consequential the allegation, the less tolerable the evidentiary shortcut.

91. THE RIGHT TO BE HEARD IS NOT SATISFIED BY ACOUSTIC RECEIPT FOLLOWED BY PROCEDURAL DISCARD. Maine's Code of Judicial Conduct requires competent and diligent administration and requires that persons with a legal interest be heard according to law. "Heard" cannot mean that sound waves entered a courtroom, a PDF acquired a timestamp, or a litigant was permitted to speak before the material substance was shunted into procedural /dev/null. An information system that returns "200 OK" while silently dropping the payload has not executed the requested operation; it has merely acknowledged

ingress. A hearing that records a person's words but disregards preserved material claims through an unexplained legacy-rule filter is the juridical equivalent: a due-process no-op, ceremonial input without adjudicative execution. It is neither meaningful nor respectable adjudication. Rules 2.5 and 2.6 do not guarantee victory, manufacture jurisdiction, or excuse noncompliance. They do require more than an opaque black-box decision engine whose output neither identifies the dispositive rule nor meaningfully addresses the decisive input while a child continues to age. [L2; P1]

91A. MEANINGFUL AND RESPECTABLE HEARING REQUIRES OBSERVABILITY, TRACEABILITY, AND A REASONED STATE TRANSITION. If a material claim is rejected because of jurisdiction, timeliness, preservation, record deficiency, or an authorized filing restriction, identify the rule, the affected claim, the specific defect, and the lawful route—if any—for correction or presentation elsewhere. That is the minimum auditability expected of every other safety-critical public system.

91B. THE INJUSTICE OF IMPUNITY WILL END THROUGH LAWFUL ACCOUNTABILITY. By "end," Appellant means records preserved, facts independently examined, responsible actors identified, reasons stated, errors corrected, and constitutional removal or disciplinary mechanisms invoked if competent evidence warrants. He does not mean violence or extrajudicial punishment.

92. THE JUDICIAL CODE DOES NOT PERMIT A RHETORICAL SHORTCUT TO FIND MISCONDUCT—NOR A ONE-WAY DOCTRINE OF CORRECTION. Rule 2.2 distinguishes ordinary legal error from an ethics violation absent willful or repeated disregard of explicit legal requirements. Appellant does not declare misconduct established merely because he disputes a decision. He insists that specific, demonstrable administrative failures and any alleged repeated disregard receive examination through the lawful processes designed for that purpose. This institution appears to experience no conceptual difficulty instructing members of the public that error requires correction, noncompliance requires remediation, and repeated conduct requires consequences. Take your own goddamn advice: identify the error, preserve the record, correct the process, explain the remedy, and stop repeating the failure. Seriousness of allegation is not proof; neither is irritation at the allegation a defense. Prestige is not immunity, institutional self-reference is not independent review, and a robe does not transmute refusal to correct into respectable adjudication. [L2]

93. FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS AND ACCESS TO REVIEW HAVE LONG BEEN RECOGNIZED AS SERIOUS. The United States Supreme Court's decision in M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996), condemned conditioning appellate review of a decree permanently terminating parental rights on an indigent parent's advance payment for the necessary record. This matter concerns custody/contact and a protection order, not an identical termination decree; the

holding must not be falsely imported as an automatic right to a government-paid transcript here. Its careful recognition of the gravity of familial interests nonetheless makes complacency about meaningful record access a particularly impoverished position. [L3; C2–C3]

94. THIS CASE PRESENTS DOCUMENTED ACCESS BARRIERS, NOT A FREESTANDING RESEARCH EXPERIMENT. In this record, the January 27 transcript estimate sought a $1,515.90 deposit; a February 18 motion sought audio or a settled-statement alternative; multiple eFileMaine submissions were returned for service contact, caption, exhibit, form, or proposed-order mechanics; and the June 23 Law Court order limited presentment of further submissions. The legal propriety and prejudice of each event must be determined individually. Their existence, however, rebuts any suggestion that Appellant's concern about cumulative procedure is a mere rhetorical hallucination. [C2–C5]

94A. NO "MOORE" — NINETEEN TIMES. Judge Lucy's February 11, 2026 order rendered Ms. Morse as "Ms. Moore" nineteen times while purporting to resolve credibility, abuse, parental rights, contempt, and the future structure of a child's relationship with his father. [C1] Appellant therefore addresses the author of that order in the Court's own accidental nomenclature: No "Moore" racketeering allegations buried beneath professional irritation. No "Moore" preventable harm to children normalized as procedural residue. No "Moore." The refrain demands neutral investigation; it is not a declaration that any uncharged person has been

adjudicated guilty of a crime. But nineteen identity errors in a nineteen-page final order demand substantially greater epistemic humility before dismissing concerns about record integrity and factual framing.

95. THIS INSTITUTION HAS THE AUTHORITY TO REVISE ITS OWN MACHINERY. Indeed, the Judicial Branch announced a November 2, 2026 amendment instructing filers to use available court-approved forms or provide an explanatory cover letter when the form is unsuitable, explicitly discussing how to avoid rejection of submissions. The Branch can change procedural administration when it chooses. It cannot then plausibly present existing process as sacred, immutable, or beyond examination. Whether any specific rule has been lawfully applied remains a separate question. [L4]

96. THE RESEARCH IS NOTICE OF FORESEEABLE RISK, NOT A SUBSTITUTE FOR THE RECORD. The research cited herein is offered to explain why repeated conflicts, uncertain contact, economic strain, and delayed child-centered support warrant careful and timely handling. It is not tendered as an extra-record diagnosis, proof of causation, proof of a parent's wrongdoing, or a basis to disregard a protection order. Each disputed event must rest on properly admitted evidence and applicable law. The Court should have no difficulty making that distinction if it applies the same analytic rigor it demands of the unrepresented father before it. [R1–R12; C1–C7]

97. THE GOVERNMENT HAS NO MONOPOLY ON INSTITUTIONAL MEMORY. When scholarship has long identified the risks of chronic conflict, unstable relationships, and cumulative adversity, it is extraordinary for a public institution to reserve its most meticulous attention for the presentation format of the parent who raises those concerns. The question is not whether a justice has personally read each study. It is whether a system entrusted with children has developed and applied procedures proportionate to known and foreseeable developmental stakes. That is the public-accountability question this Court should be capable of hearing without regarding the inquiry itself as an affront.

98. THE SHARPEST DAGGER TO PUBLIC TRUST IS NOT ERROR BUT PERSISTENCE WITHOUT CANDOR. A mistake candidly identified, reviewed, and corrected may strengthen public confidence. A process defended merely because it has endured, even after its avoidable burdens are made visible, does the opposite. Professional pride cannot transmute repetition into sound judgment. A bench that finds endless energy to lecture parents on decorum while failing to identify a workable route to timely and lawful child-protective consideration should expect severe criticism. There is no special jurisprudential immunity for a practice merely because it is old.

99. DEFERENCE TO LAWFUL AUTHORITY IS NOT OBSEQUIOUSNESS TO ADMINISTRATIVE VANITY. Appellant will observe lawful orders, including protective provisions and jurisdictional limitations. He

will not pretend that lawful compliance requires applause for every delay, filing return, unresolved records-access dispute, or denial. Public respect is not a perpetual entitlement of judicial office. It is continually tested by how the system treats the people who have the least time, money, and expertise to spare.

100. THE REQUEST IS NOT FOR UNREASONED INDULGENCE BUT FOR AN ACCOUNTABLE PATH. Appellant seeks identification of preserved issues actually resolved; the legal basis for any dispositive procedural ruling; the proper forum for remaining enforcement and implementation matters; and any relief that is timely, cognizable, and consistent with the child's safety. He does not request the Court decide disputed post-order facts on appeal without a lawful record. He requests that the administrative architecture stop making the identification of an actual, available remedy an exercise in self-consuming futility.

101. PUBLICATION IS ACCOUNTABILITY, NOT AN ATTEMPT TO COERCE JUDICIAL MERITS. Appellant intends to publish and lawfully distribute this public-interest account, without disclosing the minor child's confidential medical, educational, or identifying records. The Court remains obligated to decide the matter only according to law and admissible materials, not public clamor. Publication is a means of permitting the People to examine what their institutions require and accomplish, not a request that public pressure substitute for judicial judgment.

102. AN END TO THE MOST EXQUISITE FORM OF LEARNED HELPLESSNESS. The learned profession has had decades of developmental scholarship, years of publicly available access-to-justice findings, an explicit statutory commitment to children's welfare, and its own written ethical obligations. Appellant does not assert omniscience or ask for scientific certainty where none exists. He does demand an end to the performance in which procedural complexity is treated as sophistication, delay as neutrality, and a parent's demand for an intelligible remedy as the principal inconvenience. If the institution possesses the competence its titles imply, the time has arrived to demonstrate it in the substance of its work.

103. THE PEOPLE SHOULD NOT HAVE TO EARN A DOCTORATE IN PROCEDURE TO OBTAIN AN ANSWER. The public did not establish courts to stage an endless contest between the citizen's capacity to master filing minutiae and the institution's capacity to invent new opportunities for procedural failure. It established courts to apply the law to actual disputes. Children are not components of a workflow. Parents are not raw material for an eFiling vendor's correction queue. An appellate record is not an auction of who can afford to preserve the truth. And judicial integrity does not consist of indignantly refusing to hear what the evidence and the law require the institution to examine.

XV-A. PRIOR CONSTITUTIONAL PETITION, FIRST AMENDMENT, AND FEDERAL COURTESY REFERRAL

103A. THE NOVEMBER 12 PETITION WAS ALREADY EMAILED; THIS FILING WILL NOT PRETEND OTHERWISE. On November 12, 2026 at approximately 5:16 a.m. Eastern Time, Appellant transmitted a body-text petition under the subject "PUBLIC NOTICE TO THE DISHONORABLE INJUSTICES — Formal Constitutional Petition for Investigation, Impeachment, and Removal" to the members of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court and to executive, legislative, oversight, counsel, and public-accountability recipients. Gmail message ID: 1a1cf426146fa9d0. The petition had no PDF attachment; the email body was the petition. It is incorporated by reference exactly as transmitted. [C9]

103B. APPENDIX E IS A FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL AMENDMENT TO THAT PETITION. It adds the neutral-investigation demand, the nineteen-item implementation record, the nineteen "Ms. Moore" errors, the distinction between acoustic receipt and meaningful or respectable hearing, and the request for lawful federal screening.

103C. COURTESY COPIES ARE DESIGNATED FOR THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE. Concurrent with lawful service and public release, copies are designated for the Civil Rights Division and the United States Attorney's Office for the District of Maine, with a respectful request for jurisdictional screening and substantive investigation of any federal issue within

federal authority. This does not represent that DOJ has opened or accepted an investigation.

103D. INSTITUTIONAL SELF-PROTECTION THROUGH THE CONCEALMENT, FRAGMENTATION, PRICING, OR PRACTICAL INACCESSIBILITY OF RECORDS THAT ARE LAWFULLY PUBLIC IS ABHORRENT. Lawful confidentiality must protect children and genuinely protected records; it must not metastasize into a generalized anti-observability layer shielding public expenditures, training, rejection statistics, docket metadata, or official decision pathways from scrutiny.

XVI. REQUESTED RELIEF AND PROCEDURAL LIMITATION

WHEREFORE, to the extent this proceeding remains open and the requested action is authorized by the applicable rules and existing orders, Appellant requests the following:

(A) A reasoned identification, where procedurally available, of the disposition and governing basis for each material, preserved issue properly before the Court concerning the February 11, 2026 Findings and Order, without treating the mere existence of a procedural disposition as a merits finding not actually made.

(B) Clarification, to the extent permitted by the Court's jurisdiction and the June 23, 2026 order, of the lawful procedural avenue for unresolved child-related

implementation and enforcement questions that are not themselves reviewable in this appeal.

(C) Any authorized correction, reconsideration, limited remand, or other relief based on a specifically identified, timely preserved legal error, with any such request subject to the independent requirements and time limits of M.R. App. P. 10(a)(5), 14(b), and all controlling orders.

(D) In all events, recognition that the seven "procedural shoehorns" are an emphatic metaphor for judicial candor, explicit reasoning, and disciplined respect for the irretrievability of childhood, not an application for physical or punitive action.

(E) Acknowledgment, solely as legal and policy context, of the identified peer-reviewed and official scientific research on the foreseeable consequences of chronic conflict, instability, and adverse childhood experiences, without treating such research as new merits evidence or as a finding regarding this particular child.

(F) To the extent the Court has already exhausted its lawful authority or the deadlines for such relief, identification of that jurisdictional or procedural limitation without implying that unresolved child-related enforcement and implementation disputes have thereby been adjudicated on their merits.

(G) Recognition, as constitutional and public-policy context rather than automatic entitlement to a particular result, of Maine Constitution Article I, Section 19 and its language requiring justice without sale, denial, or delay; and

identification of any available lawful mechanism for addressing preserved record-access or procedural-barrier issues. [P1]

(H) Consideration, only where properly within the appellate record and applicable judicial-notice rules, of the fact that Maine's own official 2022 report identified family-court delay concerns and its 2025/2026 Task Force report documented professional education on high-conflict family cases, without inferring attendance or misconduct by any named judicial officer. [P3] [P5]

(I) A clear statement, to the extent procedurally available, separating matters actually decided on the merits from matters rejected for jurisdiction, timeliness, incomplete record, or administrative form; and identification of the authorized forum and method for future child-protective implementation requests, if any.

(J) For nonadjudicative public accountability only, notice of the administrative and funding questions identified in Appendices C and D to the Governor's Office, relevant legislative committees, and appropriate records custodians, subject to the separation of powers, valid confidentiality protections, and the parties' service rights.

(K) The preservation and appropriate referral, rather than an unsupported criminal finding, of specific Title IV-D expenditure and training-implementation questions to any lawful audit or oversight channel empowered to examine them. No RICO determination is requested by rhetorical assertion alone.

(L) Such further relief as the Court actually has authority to grant upon a particularized, timely, preserved showing of legal error, without treating general public-health research or later family events as automatically part of the appellate merits record.

XVII. NOTICE, OTHER PARTIES' POSITIONS, AND SERVICE

Notice under M.R. App. P. 10(a)(2): Patrick S. Bedard, counsel for Appellee, and Amanda Morse, Appellee, are expressly included in the designated transmission schedule below. Actual date, method, and confirmation of legally sufficient notice or service must be completed from the transmission record before filing.

Position of opposing counsel / other party: [INSERT actual position or "Not yet provided" only if accurate.]

Intention to respond: [INSERT actual response intention, if known; otherwise identify as unknown.]

Service under M.R. App. P. 1D(e) and 1E: [INSERT method, date, and persons actually served.]

Designated concurrent courtesy recipients (not deemed served merely by public distribution): every member of Maine's 133rd Legislature at the addresses used in the November 12, 2026 transmission; the Governor's Office and identified incoming-executive contacts; Maine Judicial Branch general offices; every

identified Maine judicial-officer address from the prior statewide distribution for which no automated nondelivery report was located; Maine news and public-interest media addresses for which no automated nondelivery report was located; Patrick S. Bedard; and Amanda Morse. Documented NDR addresses and temporary-delivery exceptions are separately stated in Appendix F.

XVIII. CONCLUSION

104. The judiciary may be forgiven a mistake honestly recognized and responsibly corrected. It cannot reasonably demand enduring public reverence for an administrative system merely because that system has become practiced in explaining why no further relief will be considered. The distinction between power and wisdom is not erased by the dignified typography of an order.

105. Appellant asks neither that the Court admire him nor that it disregard the adverse findings and protective provisions presently governing the parties. He asks that the institution exhibit the restraint to distinguish his indignation from the legal questions he presents; the integrity to acknowledge correctable error; and the fidelity to law necessary to tell an unrepresented father, precisely, what remedy is available and why.

106. The Court may command compliance. It may not command the restoration of lost childhood. And it should scarcely presume to chastise a father about judicial time without first contemplating the incalculably greater

temporal loss that this litigation has imposed upon his family. A docket may be closed. The years cannot be reopened.

107. If the institution wishes to reclaim public respect, it is invited to begin with candor, continue with reasoned adjudication, and conclude with the substantive application of actual justice. The time for ornamental solemnity has long passed. The child's remaining childhood has not.

108. And stop harming kids. Especially mine.

Dated: November 15, 2026

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Justin A. Tahai

Justin A. Tahai, Appellant, pro se

APPENDIX A — RESEARCH AND LEGAL AUTHORITIES CITED (PART OF THIS SINGLE MOTION)

This appendix provides bibliographic public-source references for the factual propositions in the constitutional, judicial-education, financial-accountability, and generational-harm sections. It is not expert testimony and does not supply new appellate record evidence concerning this child. Citations are supplied for independent verification and public accountability.

I. Peer-reviewed Research and Public-Health Publications

[R1] Harold, G. T., & Sellers, R. (2018). Annual Research Review: Interparental conflict and youth psychopathology: an evidence review and practice-focused update. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 59(4), 374–402. doi:10.1111/jcpp.12893.

https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/29574737/

[R2] Amato, P. R., & Keith, B. (1991). Parental divorce and the well-being of children: a meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 110(1), 26–46. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.110.1.26.

https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/1832495/

[R3] Adamsons, K., & Johnson, S. K. (2013). An updated and expanded meta-analysis of nonresident fathering and child well-being. Journal of Family Psychology, 27(4), 589–599. doi:10.1037/a0033786.

https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/23978321/

[R4] Auersperg, F., Vlasak, T., Ponocny, I., & Barth, A. (2019). Long-term effects of parental divorce on mental health: A meta-analysis. Journal of Psychiatric Research, 119, 107–115. doi:10.1016/j.jpsychires.2019.09.011.

https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/31622869/

[R5] Racine, N., et al. (2025, published online 2023). Intergenerational transmission of parent adverse childhood experiences to child outcomes: A systematic review and meta-analysis. Child Abuse & Neglect, 168, 106479. doi:10.1016/j.chiabu.2023.106479.

https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/37821290/

[R6] Harvard University, Center on the Developing Child. A Guide to Toxic Stress. Distinguishes positive, tolerable, and toxic stress and emphasizes supportive caregiver buffering.

https://developingchild.harvard.edu/resource-guides/guide-toxic-stress/

[R7] National Scientific Council on the Developing Child / Harvard Center on the Developing Child (Apr. 13, 2026). Finding the Balance: Transforming How We Think About the Body's Response to Stress in Early Childhood.

https://developingchild.harvard.edu/resources/working-paper/how-we-think-about-response-to-stress-early-childhood/

[R8] Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (Mar. 2, 2026). About Adverse Childhood Experiences. Defines ACEs and describes instability related to parental separation, protective factors, and longer-term risks.

https://www.cdc.gov/aces/about/

[R9] Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Preventing Adverse Childhood Experiences. Describes the protective role of safe, stable, and nurturing relationships and environments.

https://www.cdc.gov/aces/prevention/index.html

[R10] Blackwell, C. K., Cella, D., & Mansolf, M. (2024). Intergenerational transmission of adverse and positive childhood experiences and associations with child well-being. Child Abuse & Neglect, 157, 107050. doi:10.1016/j.chiabu.2024.107050.

https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC11512674/

[R11] Legal Services Corporation (2022). The Justice Gap: The Unmet Civil Legal Needs of Low-income Americans. National survey-based findings on substantial civil legal problems and legal assistance.

https://justicegap.lsc.gov/resource/2022-justice-gap-report/

[R12] Peterson, C., et al. (2023). Economic Burden of Health Conditions Associated With Adverse Childhood Experiences Among US Adults. JAMA Network Open, 6(12), e2346323. doi:10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2023.46323.

https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamanetworkopen/fullarticle/2812583

II. Maine Law, Court Standards, and Constitutional Context

[L1] 19-A M.R.S. § 1653. Parental rights and responsibilities; best interests; primary safety and well-being; consideration of parental relationships, child preference, stability, and abuse.

https://www.legislature.maine.gov/legis/statutes/19-A/title19-Asec1653.html

[L2] Maine Code of Judicial Conduct, Rules 1.2, 2.2, 2.5, 2.6, and 2.7. Judicial responsibility for public confidence, fairness, diligence, the lawful opportunity to be heard, and the duty to decide, subject to the express limitation concerning ordinary legal error.

https://www.cjc.maine.gov/code_conduct.html

[L3] M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996). Narrow holding concerning transcript/record costs in an appeal from permanent termination of parental rights; cited by analogy only.

https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/95-853.ZO.html

[L4] Maine Judicial Branch (Nov. 2, 2026). Administrative Order JB-20-03 amendment concerning court-approved forms and explanatory cover letters when a form is unsuitable.

https://www.courts.maine.gov/news/article.html?id=13365673

[L5] Maine Rules of Appellate Procedure, including Rules 10 and 14(b), govern motion practice, prior notice, and the time-limited route for reconsideration.

https://www.courts.maine.gov/rules/

[L6] Maine Rules of Electronic Court Systems; public access and nonpublic information in family and protection-order cases.

https://www.courts.maine.gov/ecourts/access.html

III. Constitutional Promise, Judicial Knowledge, Funding and Oversight Sources

[P1] Maine Constitution, Article I, § 19 (Right of redress for injuries). Official Maine Legislature constitution text.

https://legislature.maine.gov/ros/LawsOfMaine/App/views/constitution.html

[P2] Maine Constitution, Article I, § 15 (Right of petition: orderly and peaceable assembly and petition or remonstrance).

https://legislature.maine.gov/ros/LawsOfMaine/App/views/constitution.html

[P3] Maine Commission on Domestic and Sexual Abuse, Report to the Joint Standing Committee on Judiciary Pursuant to Resolve 2021, ch. 99: Families Facing Emergency Custody Situations (Dec. 2022). Note survey sample and limits.

https://lldc.mainelegislature.org/Open/Rpts/kf540_w68_2022.pdf

[P4] 4 M.R.S. §§ 10-A, 122, 164(19): annual training duties on domestic violence and child abuse, neglect, and maltreatment.

https://www.legis.maine.gov/legis/statutes/4/title4sec10-A.html ; https://legis.maine.gov/statutes/4/title4sec122.html ; https://legis.maine.gov/statutes/4/title4sec164.html

[P5] Maine Justice for Children Task Force, 2025 Report to the Supreme Judicial Court (submitted Jan. 15, 2026), Continuing Education section: Apr. 3-4, 2025 conference; approximately 250 attendees per day; 2,060 education credits including 345 judicial-education credits.

https://www.mecitizenreviewpanels.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/2025-Justice-for-Children-Task-Force-Annual-Report.final-2.pdf

[P6] Maine Code of Judicial Conduct, Rules 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6, including competence/diligence, the right to be heard, and judicial independence against public clamor.

https://www.cjc.maine.gov/code_conduct.html

[P7] Maine Constitution, Article VI, § 2, judicial compensation protections and prohibition on other fees/rewards for judicial services.

https://legislature.maine.gov/ros/LawsOfMaine/App/views/constitution.html

[P8] Maine 132nd Legislature, budget legislation § FFFF-1, 3% judicial salary adjustments effective July 1, 2025 and July 1, 2026.

https://web.mainelegislature.org/doc/11658

[P9] Maine Judicial Branch, 2025 Annual Report, operations, expenditures, revenue, family-case backlogs, judicial officers and magistrate funding.

https://www.courts.maine.gov/about/reports/ar2025.pdf

[P10] 42 U.S.C. §§ 655 (federal financial participation for child-support programs) and 658a (incentive payments to states).

https://uscode.house.gov/us/usc/119-136/t42/s655/ ; https://uscode.house.gov/us/usc/119-124/t42/s658a/

[P11] 42 U.S.C. § 658a and 45 C.F.R. § 305.2, five Title IV-D performance measures.

https://uscode.house.gov/us/usc/119-124/t42/s658a/ ; https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-45/subtitle-B/chapter-III/part-305/section-305.2

[P12] Maine FY2025 State Single Audit, Finding 2025-048, "Internal control over Child Support Services expenditures needs improvement," as reproduced in the federal audit-finding record. Significant deficiency; no questioned costs. Original Office of the State Auditor report controls.

https://fac.procurementexpress.com/findings/1187188

[P13] 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1964, statutory RICO definitions and prohibited conduct, including enumerated predicate acts and civil remedy limitations.

https://uscode.house.gov/us/usc/t18/s1961/ ; https://uscode.house.gov/us/usc/119-142/t18/s1962/

APPENDIX B — CASE RECORD ANCHORS AND EVIDENTIARY LIMITATIONS

Record-control instruction: This appendix is a navigation index, not a factual stipulation, certified court record, judicial notice of unadjudicated assertions, or substitute for native exhibits. Original court orders, accepted filings, affidavits, provider/school records, and service/entry notices control.

[C1] District Court Findings and Order dated February 11, 2026, consolidated YORDC-FM-2010-00190 and BIDDC-PA-2024-01285, pp. 12–19. Official order controls; the order includes adverse abuse findings and current contact/safety conditions.

[C2] January 27, 2026 eScribers order/estimate MEJB11138 for January 16 hearing; private-pay deposit estimated at $1,515.90. Obtain native order/estimate for judicial exhibit use.

[C3] February 18, 2026 motion seeking electronic recording/audio in lieu of transcript or a settled statement, BIDDC-PA-2024-01285.

[C4] eFileMaine/Tyler rejection and correction notices for envelopes 210756, 210987, 211286, 220333, with notices in April–May 2026. Submission, rejection, corrected service, and acceptance are legally distinct.

[C5] Law Court Order on Pending Motions entered June 23, 2026, Yor-26-118, pp. 1–2. Controls whether future filings will be presented for judicial action.

[C6] June 18 and June 22, 2026 Noble school-source materials summarized in Master Timeline v17B/v21; native attendance records and school definitions control; minor's personal details omitted.

[C7] July 27–August 29, 2026 York Hospital portal and records-access correspondence summarized in Master Timeline v24; native provider records, portal policies, and audit history control; no finding as to who caused access limitations.

[C8] July 1, 2026 email, "Outstanding Response Items - Parker / Implementation / Records Access," Gmail message ID 19f1f7b9a76cdf25. The email lists nineteen numbered items and asks that any claimed prior answer be identified by date, subject line, and exact response.

[C9] November 12, 2026 email-body petition, "PUBLIC NOTICE TO THE DISHONORABLE INJUSTICES — Formal Constitutional Petition for Investigation, Impeachment, and Removal," Gmail message ID 1a1cf426146fa9d0. The original email body controls; it had no PDF attachment.

APPENDIX C — SPECIFIC RECORDS TO TEST THE PROFESSION'S KNOWLEDGE, IMPLEMENTATION, AND FINANCIAL CONTROLS

This is a public accountability request inventory. It does not assume that all listed documents are public, exist, are held by one custodian, may be obtained under FOAA, or may be compelled in the pending appeal. A separate written request to each appropriate custodian and review of confidentiality restrictions may be required. The list is not a demand that this appellate court order nonparties to respond without jurisdiction.

C-01. EDUCATION — SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT. Annual course titles, dates, learning objectives, and nonprivileged materials made available under 4 M.R.S. § 10-A for 2022-2026; separately, available individual judicial attendance or continuing-education documentation, if disclosable.

C-02. EDUCATION — SUPERIOR / DISTRICT. The corresponding offerings under 4 M.R.S. §§ 122 and 164(19), with provider names, program cost, and any nonprivileged assessment of completion or effectiveness.

C-03. APRIL 2025 CONFERENCE. Agenda; speakers; session descriptions; contracts/fees; attendee categories; how the 2,060 credits were calculated; judicial-participant attendance, only to the extent lawful and disclosable.

C-04. TRAINING IMPLEMENTATION. Written policies, bench guidance, administrative protocols, or internal project reports applying instruction

about high-conflict communication, child well-being, due-process boundaries, or delay to actual family-case management.

C-05. 2022 COMMISSION REPORT. Executive and judicial implementation plans, status reports, and legislative responses addressing the working group's recommendations, with dates and reasons for adoption or nonadoption.

C-06. FAMILY CASE TIMELINESS. Aggregate, privacy-protected time from emergency motion submission to acceptance, hearing, ruling, and service for 2022-2026, distinguished by case type and county.

C-07. EFILE ACCESS. Aggregate Tyler/eFileMaine rejection reasons and counts, relation-back rates, cure-success rates, technical support outages, and differences between initial submission, service, accepted entry, and judicial consideration.

C-08. RECORD ACCESS. Nonprivileged policies and costs governing audio access, transcripts, indigency requests, record completion, and statements in lieu; aggregate times and waiver outcomes.

C-09. TITLE IV-D COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS. Executed agreements and amendments between DHHS and the Judicial Branch for fiscal years 2024-2026, including scope, rates, cost-allocation methodology, approval controls, and service descriptions.

C-10. COURT-SERVICE ACTUAL-COST RECONCILIATION. Quarterly and annual records responsive to FY2025 Audit Finding 2025-048, actual per-minute rates, cost updates, paid transfers, and adjustments, subject to confidentiality and fiscal-record access rules.

C-11. AUDIT REMEDIATION. The corrective-action plan, completion evidence, validation materials, any independent follow-up, and explanation of any revised controls after March 31, 2026.

C-12. INCENTIVE AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES. State Title IV-D incentive award amounts and methodology; applicable reinvestment reports; whether the State tracks timeliness, appropriate modification, family stability, and procedural fairness alongside mandated federal outcomes.

C-13. JUDICIAL COMPENSATION AND ADMINISTRATION. Published salary schedules, judicial-branch appropriations, caseload studies, and public performance reports—not speculative private benefits from individual case outcomes.

C-14. PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / EXEMPTION LOG. For any denied record, identify the record category, custodian, applicable exemption or restriction, and available administrative or judicial review route, rather than treating silence as an answer.

C-15. CASE-SPECIFIC AUDIT TRAIL. Preserve original eFile envelopes, rejection notices, clerk-entry records, service and paper-mail evidence, judicial

docket entries, and transcript/audio requests and rulings for any authorized subsequent proceeding.

APPENDIX D — PUBLIC RELEASE, GOVERNOR'S OFFICE COURTESY NOTICE, AND LEGAL LIMITATIONS

For public circulation, this one document omits unnecessary identification of the minor child and avoids reproducing private clinical records, school portal credentials, confidential case material, and unredacted third-party communications. An appropriately filed court copy may be subject to stricter confidentiality requirements. Publication of a motion does not make protected material public.

Any courtesy copy to the Governor's Office is for review of statewide administration, executive-agency financial controls, and potential legislative improvements. It is not a request to influence adjudication of the pending family or appellate matter. The Governor has no authority to order the Law Court to decide a case in a requested way.

For accuracy, the documentary chain is: (1) the 2022 official report records concerns; (2) judicial education is mandated by statute; (3) a 2025 conference and continuing-education credits are recorded; (4) the Judicial Branch acknowledges ongoing family-case backlogs; (5) FY2025 Title IV-D accounting controls were the subject of a significant-deficiency finding; and (6) this Appellant documents contested processes and impacts in his own matter. That chain establishes notice,

institutional activity, and grounds for further questions. It does NOT conclusively establish criminal intent, a RICO conspiracy, each judge's attendance, actual financial enrichment, or causation of any child's specific condition.

If there is to be an institutional response worthy of the Constitution's promise, let it be a response that names the authorized decision-maker, produces the relevant public record, states what has been corrected, and identifies the lawful route for unresolved issues. Let it not be another performance of antiquated procedural solemnity masquerading as the entire substance of justice.

PUBLIC-DISTRIBUTION AND SAFETY LIMITATIONS

This document contains criticism of governmental institutions and a request for lawful judicial accountability. It does not seek physical harm, extrajudicial punishment, or influence upon judicial findings through public pressure. No minor child's full name, birth date, home address, private medical records, school portal screenshots, or confidential provider notes are reproduced in this public-distribution text. The governing protection order, all lawful service rules, and any restrictions on access to confidential court records remain applicable.

Research limitations: The studies cited describe population-level associations and possible mechanisms, not adjudicated causation in this family. References to adverse childhood experiences, public-health costs, intergenerational risk, or protective relationships are not findings that any particular parent, judge, lawyer, or court caused a specific injury. Any assertion of improper conduct must be evaluated against the specific authenticated record and governing legal standard.

APPENDIX E — FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL AMENDMENT TO THE NOVEMBER 12, 2026 CONSTITUTIONAL PETITION

This appendix incorporates the November 12, 2026 email-body petition by reference exactly as transmitted; it does not misrepresent that prior transmission as a newly created attachment.

I. INCORPORATION OF THE PETITION ACTUALLY TRANSMITTED

1. On November 12, 2026 at approximately 5:16 a.m. Eastern Time, Petitioner transmitted by Gmail a body-text petition bearing the subject "PUBLIC NOTICE TO THE DISHONORABLE INJUSTICES — Formal Constitutional Petition for Investigation, Impeachment, and Removal." The transmission was directed to the seven members of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court and to executive, legislative, oversight, counsel, and public-accountability recipients. Gmail message ID: 1a1cf426146fa9d0. The petition was not a PDF attachment; the email body itself was the petition. It is incorporated here by reference exactly as sent. [C9]

2. This Amendment neither retracts that petition nor misdescribes it as newly served. It supplements the prior petition with additional record anchors and a more particularized demand for neutral investigation, auditable findings, lawful referral, and constitutional accountability.

3. The same evidentiary rigor demanded from the citizen must be applied to institutional exculpation. Professional irritation, collegial familiarity, ceremonial finality, and the prestige of office are not evidence.

II. THE PROFESSION'S OWN KNOWLEDGE AND THE FAILURE OF IMPLEMENTATION

4. Maine law requires annual judicial education concerning domestic violence and child abuse, neglect, and maltreatment. The Judicial Branch and affiliated professional bodies have repeatedly convened programming on trauma, high-conflict family proceedings, child development, communication, and courtroom practice. The profession therefore cannot plausibly treat the foreseeable consequences of chronic conflict, developmental delay, relationship disruption, and inaccessible relief as occult knowledge unavailable to its decision-makers.

5. Knowledge without implementation is not expertise. It is inert cognition. Knowledge followed by continued tolerance of the same preventable harms may become operationalized indifference: the institutional equivalent of a safety bulletin acknowledged, archived, and ignored while the failure mode remains in production.

III. NINETEEN UNRESOLVED ITEMS AND THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN RECEIPT AND RESPONSE

6. On July 1, 2026, Petitioner transmitted a consolidated, numbered list of nineteen unresolved implementation and records-access items to Attorney Patrick S. Bedard and Amanda Morse, with reunification provider Daniel Pierce copied. The list addressed contact methods, therapy logistics, provider and insurance information, in-person scheduling, school access, dental records, holiday time, non-disparagement, and alleged exposure of the child to adult litigation narratives. Gmail message ID: 19f1f7b9a76cdf25. [C8]

7. Nineteen discrete, auditable items are not "noise." A minimally competent institution resolves, denies, routes, or identifies the defect in each item. It does not transform an unresolved queue into a lecture about tone.

IV. PROTECTION AGAINST ABUSE REQUIRES SUBSTANTIVE NEUTRAL INVESTIGATION

8. Safety is primary. That principle is too important to be degraded into a professional prestige heuristic. When allegations of abuse, coercion, alienation, interference, developmental injury, and continuing risk intersect, the legally serious response is evidence preservation, neutral investigation, explicit findings tied to identified proof, and narrowly tailored safeguards.

9. A lawyer's seniority, familiarity with the bench, or decades of practice are not corroboration. A robe is not a substitute for competence; a title is not evidence; tradition is not justification; and professional collegiality is not a neutral investigator. To the extent the January 16, 2026 hearing record reflects reliance upon counsel's claimed thirty-plus years of experience or professional familiarity, the recording and transcript—not reputation—must determine what was said, what supported it, and why it was credited.

V. THE RIGHT TO BE HEARD IS NOT CEREMONIAL DATA INGESTION

10. Maine's Code of Judicial Conduct requires competence, diligence, and the right to be heard according to law. "Heard" cannot mean that sound waves reached the bench, a PDF acquired a timestamp, or a litigant was permitted to speak before the material substance was discarded through an unexplained legacy-rule filter.

11. An information system that returns "200 OK" while silently dropping the payload has not performed the requested operation; it has merely acknowledged ingress. A judicial process that records words but refuses reasoned engagement with preserved material issues is the juridical equivalent: a due-process no-op, ceremonial input without adjudicative execution. It is neither meaningful nor respectable adjudication.

12. A competent adjudicative architecture must be observable and traceable. If a claim fails for jurisdiction, timeliness, preservation, record deficiency, or filing restriction, identify the rule, affected claim, specific defect, and authorized route—if any—for correction or presentation elsewhere.

VI. NO "MOORE" — NINETEEN TIMES

13. The February 11, 2026 Findings and Order rendered Ms. Morse as "Ms. Moore" nineteen times while purporting to resolve credibility, abuse, parental rights, contempt, and the future structure of a child's relationship with his father. Nineteen errors in the identity of a principal party are not a typographical atom; they are a documented record-integrity failure by the persons styling themselves the "responsible" decision-makers.

14. Petitioner therefore states, directly to the author of that order—Mr. John B. Lucy and/or/with Mr. Patrick S. Bedard: No "Moore" racketeering allegations buried beneath professional irritation. No "Moore" preventable harm to children normalized as procedural residue. No "Moore." The refrain demands investigation; it is not a declaration that any uncharged person has been adjudicated guilty of racketeering.

VII. THE INJUSTICE OF IMPUNITY WILL END THROUGH LAWFUL ACCOUNTABILITY

15. By "end," Petitioner means records preserved, facts independently examined, decision-makers identified, reasons stated, errors corrected, and constitutional discipline or removal mechanisms invoked if competent evidence warrants. He does not mean violence, intimidation, or extrajudicial punishment.

16. Institutional impunity exists where no one must investigate, explain, correct, measure, disclose, or answer. It is sustained by opacity, fragmented custodianship, status deference, and the proposition that the public may examine every citizen while the institution remains exempt from reciprocal observability.

VIII. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE COURTESY REFERRAL AND PUBLIC-RECORDS PRESERVATION

17. Concurrent with public release and lawful service, courtesy copies are designated for the United States Department of Justice Civil Rights Division and the United States Attorney's Office for the District of Maine, with a respectful request for jurisdictional screening and substantive investigation of any federal issue within federal authority. This does not represent that the Department of Justice has opened, accepted, or endorsed any investigation.

18. Institutional self-protection through the concealment, fragmentation, pricing, or practical inaccessibility of records that are lawfully public is abhorrent.

Confidential child, medical, educational, and protected judicial records must remain protected. That lawful confidentiality cannot be promiscuously expanded into a generalized shield against scrutiny of public expenditures, training, administrative protocols, rejection statistics, docket metadata, or official decision pathways.

IX. REQUESTED ACTION

19. Petitioner requests preservation of the November 12 petition and this Amendment as a single constitutional-accountability record; designation of an accountable recipient; and a written response identifying the authority, process, and timetable for review.

20. Petitioner requests independent investigation into the documented training, implementation, family-case timeliness, public-record access, eFile rejection, transcript/audio access, Title IV-D accounting, and case-specific process-integrity issues identified in the consolidated filing and its appendices.

21. If competent evidence establishes constitutional grounds, Petitioner requests initiation of the applicable impeachment, address, removal, discipline, or referral procedure. If the evidence does not establish such grounds, the reviewing authority should say so in a reasoned public disposition identifying what evidence was reviewed.

X. CONCLUSION

22. A self-proclaimed learned profession that learned the harms, memorialized the harms, awarded education credit for discussing the harms, and then allegedly continued reproducing the same failure modes cannot answer with ceremonial seriousness and procedural recursion.

23. No “Moore” alleged racketeering left uninvestigated. No “Moore” harming children. No “Moore.”

24. As previously stated in my letter addressed “TO ALL COURTS,” dated July of 2025 —

“In the early stages of becoming a man, I learned to wield the figurative sword. For my son, I learned to wield the pen. For my family, should they ever need it of me, I would wield both.

To borrow a phrase from our southern brethren, “Don’t tread on me.” Or my family. Should any member, or group therein, of the judiciary take issue with the language of this filing, they would do well to go to hell on their own accord.”

25. Should the People of our State ever see fit to make your knowingly harming our children the capital crime I believe it should be… should it be needed of me, I would build the goddamn gallows myself. Your depraved indifference is repugnant.

26. Stop harming kids. Especially mine.

Dated: November 15, 2026

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Justin A. Tahai

Justin A. Tahai, FATHER

CERTIFICATE / NOTICE OF TRANSMISSION

The November 12, 2026 petition was transmitted under the subject identified above. This consolidated filing and First Supplemental Amendment are designated for concurrent service and courtesy distribution according to Appendix F. The absence of an automated nondelivery report is recorded only as "no NDR located"; it is not represented as proof that a recipient opened, read, accepted, or endorsed the transmission. Before use, complete the actual transmission date, Gmail message ID, legally sufficient service method, and recipients actually provided a copy.

Date transmitted: This 15th day of November, 2026.

APPENDIX F — COURTESY-DISTRIBUTION MATRIX, PRIOR NDR EXCEPTIONS, AND TRANSMISSION CERTIFICATION

This appendix records the designated distribution universe using prior Gmail transmission metadata and automated nondelivery history. "No NDR located"

means only that no automated nondelivery report was found for the exact address in the reviewed transmission window. It is not proof of actual delivery, opening, reading, acceptance, or endorsement. Legally sufficient service on Patrick S. Bedard and Amanda Morse remains distinct from public courtesy distribution and must be completed and certified by an authorized method.

I. PARTIES AND COUNSEL — EXPRESSLY INCLUDED

Recipient	Address	Transmission note
Patrick S. Bedard	psbedlaw@bedardbobrow.com	Primary opposing-counsel address used in prior transmissions.
Patrick S. Bedard	psbedlaw@comcast.net	Alternate address used in prior transmissions.
Amanda Morse	amanda.morse20@gmail.com	Appellee. A November 15, 2026 notice reported a temporary 452 4.2.2 inbox-full delay; this is not recorded here as a permanent NDR.

II. LEGISLATURE AND EXECUTIVE

Every member-address of Maine's 133rd Legislature included in the November 12, 2026 sent message (Gmail message ID 1a1cf426146fa9d0) is incorporated into this distribution schedule. No legislator-specific NDR was located in that message thread. Leadership addresses were included both individually and within the full legislative list.

Executive recipient	Address
Office of the Governor of Maine	governor@maine.gov
Incoming-executive contact	info@hannahforgovernor.com

Incoming-executive contact	admin@hannahforgovernor.com

III. MAINE JUDICIAL BRANCH GENERAL OFFICES

Address	Status treatment
info@courts.maine.gov	No NDR located in the prior statewide-distribution record reviewed.
barbara.cardone@courts.maine.gov	No NDR located in the prior statewide-distribution record reviewed.
lawcourt.clerk@courts.maine.gov	No NDR located in the prior statewide-distribution record reviewed.
lawcourt-clerk@courts.maine.gov	No NDR located in the prior statewide-distribution record reviewed.
business.court@courts.maine.gov	No NDR located in the prior statewide-distribution record reviewed.
ecourtshelp@courts.maine.gov	No NDR located in the prior statewide-distribution record reviewed.
oto@courts.maine.gov	No NDR located in the prior statewide-distribution record reviewed.
accessibility@courts.maine.gov	No NDR located in the prior statewide-distribution record reviewed.
interpreters@courts.maine.gov	No NDR located in the prior statewide-distribution record reviewed.

IV. JUDICIAL-OFFICER ADDRESSES FOR WHICH NO NDR WAS LOCATED

The following exact addresses were included in the August 21, 2026 statewide judicial distribution or a later corrected transmission, and no automated nondelivery report was located for the exact address in the reviewed record. Obsolete or rejected variants are listed separately.

alicia.cushing@courts.maine.gov	amy.dieterich@courts.maine.gov
amy.faircloth@courts.maine.gov	andrew.lizotte@courts.maine.gov
andrew.m.mead@courts.maine.gov	andrew.robinson@courts.maine.gov
ann.m.murray@courts.maine.gov	arnold.clark@courts.maine.gov
barbara.raimondi@courts.maine.gov	brent.davis@courts.maine.gov
brianne.martin@courts.maine.gov	bruce.c.mallonee@courts.maine.gov
carrie.linthicum@courts.maine.gov	catherine.connors@courts.maine.gov
charles.dow@courts.maine.gov	christopher.taub@courts.maine.gov
daniel.billings@courts.maine.gov	daniel.mitchell@courts.maine.gov
darcie.mcelwee@courts.maine.gov	deborah.p.cashman@courts.maine.gov
e.mary.kelly@courts.maine.gov	eric.walker@courts.maine.gov
erika.bristol@courts.maine.gov	gregory.campbell@courts.maine.gov
harold.stewart@courts.maine.gov	heather.seasonwein@courts.maine.gov
james.martemucci@courts.maine.gov	jeana.mccormick@courts.maine.gov
jeffrey.h.moskowitz@courts.maine.gov	jeffrey.wilson@courts.maine.gov
jennifer.archer@courts.maine.gov	jennifer.nofsinger@courts.maine.gov
john.lucy@courts.maine.gov	john.martin@courts.maine.gov
john.oneil.jr@courts.maine.gov	julia.g.pitney@courts.maine.gov
julia.lipez@courts.maine.gov	katherine.tierney@courts.maine.gov
keith.a.powers@courts.maine.gov	lea-anne.sutton@courts.maine.gov
lindsay.cadwallader@courts.maine.gov	loralie.spooner@courts.maine.gov
m.michaela.murphy@courts.maine.gov	marygay.kennedy@courts.maine.gov
matthew.tice@courts.maine.gov	meghan.szylvian@courts.maine.gov
michael.a.duddy@courts.maine.gov	nancy.mills@courts.maine.gov
patricia.g.worth@courts.maine.gov	patrick.larson@courts.maine.gov
peter.darvin@courts.maine.gov	peter.j.goranites@courts.maine.gov
peter.malia@courts.maine.gov	philip.mohlar@courts.maine.gov
rae.ann.french@courts.maine.gov	raphaelle.silver@courts.maine.gov
richard.mulhern@courts.maine.gov	rick.e.lawrence@courts.maine.gov
robert.e.mullen@courts.maine.gov	robert.laskey@courts.maine.gov
roland.a.cole@courts.maine.gov	sarah.churchill@courts.maine.gov

sarah.gilbert@courts.maine.gov	sean.magenis@courts.maine.gov
sean.ociepka@courts.maine.gov	stephen.nelson@courts.maine.gov
steve.chandler@courts.maine.gov	susan.driscoll@courts.maine.gov
susan.oram@courts.maine.gov	tammy.ham-thompson@courts.maine.gov
terence.harrigan@courts.maine.gov	theodore.irwin@courts.maine.gov
thomas.d.warren@courts.maine.gov	thomas.mckeon@courts.maine.gov
tracie.l.adamson@courts.maine.gov	tracy.gorham@courts.maine.gov
valerie.stanfill@courts.maine.gov	wayne.douglas@courts.maine.gov

V. DOCUMENTED JUDICIAL-ADDRESS NDRS OR BLOCKED ALIASES

Address returning NDR / block	**Record treatment**
andrea.najarian@courts.maine.gov	Address-not-found NDR August 21.
andrew.mead@courts.maine.gov	Blocked November 12; corrected andrew.m.mead@courts.maine.gov appears in the non-NDR list.
david.f.hathaway@courts.maine.gov	Address-not-found NDR August 21.
harold.stewart.ii@courts.maine.gov	Address-not-found NDR August 21; alternate harold.stewart@courts.maine.gov produced no located NDR.
harris.a.mattson@courts.maine.gov	Address-not-found NDR August 21.
jed.j.french@courts.maine.gov	Address-not-found NDR August 21.
jeff.moskowitz@courts.maine.gov	Blocked November 12; corrected jeffrey.h.moskowitz@courts.maine.gov appears in the non-NDR list.
jeffrey.moskowitz@courts.maine.gov	Blocked November 12; corrected jeffrey.h.moskowitz@courts.maine.gov appears in the non-NDR list.
jon.a.haddow@courts.maine.gov	Address-not-found NDR August 21.
julia.greenleaf.pitney@courts.maine.gov	Address-not-found NDR August 21; alternate julia.g.pitney@courts.maine.gov produced no located NDR.
katherine.m.dufour@courts.maine.gov	Address-not-found NDR August 21.
maria.a.woodman@courts.maine.gov	Address-not-found NDR August 21.

mary.michaela.murphy@courts.maine.gov	Address-not-found NDR August 21; alternate m.michaela.murphy@courts.maine.gov produced no located NDR.
michael.duddy@courts.maine.gov	Blocked November 12; corrected michael.a.duddy@courts.maine.gov appears in the non-NDR list.
michael.p.roberts@courts.maine.gov	Address-not-found NDR August 21.
richard.w.mulhern@courts.maine.gov	Address-not-found NDR August 21; later richard.mulhern@courts.maine.gov produced no located NDR.
rick.lawrence@courts.maine.gov	Blocked November 12; corrected rick.e.lawrence@courts.maine.gov appears in the non-NDR list.
robert.a.langner@courts.maine.gov	Address-not-found NDR August 21.
tammy.hamthompson@courts.maine.gov	Address-not-found NDR August 21; hyphenated tammy.ham-thompson@courts.maine.gov produced no located NDR.
william.r.stokes@courts.maine.gov	Address-not-found NDR August 21.

VI. MAINE NEWS AND PUBLIC-INTEREST MEDIA ADDRESSES FOR WHICH NO NDR WAS LOCATED

The following exact Maine media addresses were used in the November 12 petition distribution or the August 21 statewide distribution and produced no located automated nondelivery report in the reviewed record.

8investigates@wmtw.com	business@pressherald.com
cferguson@bangordailynews.com	comments@mainepublic.org
contact@sunjournal.com	contact@themainemonitor.org
desk@newscentermaine.com	dmacleod@bangordailynews.com
editor@amjamboafrica.com	editor@themainemirror.com

editor@themainewire.com	features@pressherald.com
info@harpswellanchor.org	info@mainemorningstar.com
joliver@harpswellanchor.org	josh@themainemonitor.org
kate@themainemonitor.org	letters@bangordailynews.com
letters@centralmaine.com	letters@pressherald.com
letters@seacoastonline.com	letters@sunjournal.com
letters@timesrecord.com	mshepherd@bangordailynews.com
mweidmayer@bangordailynews.com	news@560wgan.com
news@bangordailynews.com	news@boothbayregister.com
news@centralmaine.com	news@ellsworthamerican.com
news@lcnme.com	news@penbaypilot.com
news@pressherald.com	news@seacoastonline.com
news@sunjournal.com	news@thecounty.me
news@timesrecord.com	news@wagmtv.com
newsroom@centralmaine.com	newsroom@pressherald.com
sloftus@bangordailynews.com	sports@pressherald.com
tellmemore@mainepublic.org	tips@bangordailynews.com
tips@mainepublic.org	tips@pressherald.com
tips@themainewire.com	tips@wgme.com
tvmail@wgme.com	wabi@wabi.tv
wmtw@wmtw.com	

VII. DOCUMENTED MEDIA NDRS

Address	**NDR treatment**
tips@mainenewsnow.com	Permanent delivery failure / recipient server did not accept connection requests; final NDR in the November 12 petition thread.
employees@themainemonitor.org	Google Group unavailable or sender lacked posting permission; NDR generated November 12, 2026.

VIII. TRANSMISSION CERTIFICATION TO BE COMPLETED AFTER ACTUAL SENDING

Date and time transmitted: _____

Gmail message ID(s): _____

Patrick S. Bedard — actual method/date:

_____

Amanda Morse — actual method/date:

_____

Public/governmental courtesy distribution completed: Yes / No / Partial.

Later NDRs appended: _____.